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Income mobility and income inequality in Scottish agriculture 
Paul Allanson, Kalina Kasprzyk and Andrew P. Barnes
* 
[Original submitted July 2015, Revision received April 2016, Accepted July 2016] 
Abstract:  The paper explores the distributional consequences of farm income mobility in 
Scotland, focusing on the extent to which farm income inequality is a chronic as opposed to a 
temporary phenomenon and on the nature of the dynamic processes driving changes in farm 
income inequality over time.  The empirical results reveal that the majority of farm income 
inequality was long-run or structural in nature, reflecting differences in both farm business 
size and farm-specific factors such as land quality, managerial ability and business 
structures.  Evidence of absolute convergence in farm incomes is explained by short-run 
adjustments towards equilibrium or target incomes conditional upon prices, technology and 
farm business size, with farm business growth conditional upon survival found to have had 
no significant redistributive effect.   
 
Keywords: farm incomes, income mobility, income inequality, Scotland.  
JEL classifications: D31, D63, Q18 
 
1. Introduction 
Income mobility at the farm level is a major driver of changes in the distribution of farm 
incomes at the sectoral level.  However, this connection has received less attention than it 
deserves in empirical work.  The main aim of this paper is to explore the distributional 
implications of farm income changes in Scottish agriculture and thus address two distinct but 
interrelated issues that are of relevance to policy makers.  Firstly, we consider the extent to 
which farm income inequality is a short-run phenomenon, due to transitory income shocks, as 
opposed to a chronic problem owing to ‘permanent’ differences in income between farms.  If 
income inequality is largely transitory then this becomes less of a policy concern, although 
there may still be a call for intervention to provide insurance measures or compensation aid in 
the event of disasters.  Conversely, if income inequality reflects ‘permanent’ differences in 
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income then attention should focus more on targeting support to those deemed in need of 
assistance.  Secondly, we consider whether the pattern of farm income growth has been 
systematically biased in favour of high or low income farms and the extent to which this may 
have been driven by changes in the farm business size structure.  If income growth is 
concentrated among farms at the top of the income distribution, this may call for structural 
measures to alleviate the constraints that trap some farms in a low income condition.  Even if 
income growth rates are higher on average on low income than high income farms, income 
inequality may rise due to the dispersion in individual growth rates among farms with similar 
initial levels of income.   
We add to a relatively small body of literature that makes use of longitudinal data to 
analyse the micro-dynamics of farm incomes.  In particular, a number of previous studies 
(e.g. Hegrenes et al., 2001, Meuwissen et. al., 2008) have provided evidence of considerable 
volatility in individual farm incomes, thereby emphasising the importance of using multiyear 
average data to draw meaningful conclusions about the living standards of individual farmers.  
We complement this work by proposing an alternative to the Shorrocks (1978) mobility index 
that measures the extent to which incomes are equalized over the longer term based on 
equilibrium rather than multiyear average incomes.  Phimister et al. (2004) have further 
explored the impact of the movements of farms within the income distribution on the 
persistence of poverty in Scottish agriculture, building on an older tradition of modelling 
income mobility within agriculture using transition matrices (see e.g. Meuwissen et. al (2008) 
for a recent example).  We more broadly characterise the process of distributional change 
underlying the evolution of cross-sectional inequality in farm incomes over time by adapting 
and extending the regression-based decomposition procedures proposed in Allanson and 
Petrie (2013).  Specifically, we decompose changes in cross-sectional farm income inequality 
over time into vertical and horizontal income mobility components, where the former 
addresses the question of whether high or low income farms have benefited more from farm 
income growth and the latter captures the effects of the reranking of farms in the income 
distribution.  We further identify the contribution of farm business size changes to vertical 
mobility based on a dynamic model of farm incomes that explicitly takes into account the 
impact of both systematic factors and transitory shocks. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 establishes the empirical setting, 
providing a brief description of the Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) dataset used in the study 
and reporting some basic descriptive statistics for our preferred definition of farm income.  
Section 3 employs the Shorrocks (1978) mobility index to provide a first look at the extent to 
2 
 
which farm incomes are equalised over the longer term.  Section 4 characterizes changes in 
farm income inequality over time, identifying both the extent to which vertical mobility may 
have been driven by farm business growth and the factors that contribute to equilibrium or 
structural inequality.  The section also presents our alternative measure of the potential for 
the equalisation of farm incomes over the longer term.  The final section concludes with a 
discussion of the empirical findings in the light of the most recent round of CAP reform.   
 
2.  Data 
Longitudinal data are required to explore the distributional implications of farm income 
mobility.  For example, if half the farms in Scotland are always poor while half are rich then 
it will not be possible to determine whether it is always the same farms in each category by 
examining changes in cross-sectional data over time.  We construct an unbalanced panel of 
farms using data from the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) relating to the farming years 
from 1995/66 to 2009/10.  The study examines mobility both over the whole of the study 
period and for the two sub-periods defined by the introduction of the Single Farm Payment 
scheme in 2005/06. 
The FAS is an annual survey of around 500 full-time farms carried out on behalf of 
the Scottish Government and provides the main source of microeconomic data on farm 
businesses in Scotland, with data collected on a range of physical and financial variables.  
The survey is conducted on an accounting year basis with a typical year-end in early March.  
Thus, for example, the 1995/96 FAS centres on the 1995 production and subsidy year.  The 
FAS is based on a stratified simple random sample, with farms chosen randomly to be 
representative of their economic size and type.  Economic size is measured in terms of 
standard gross margin (SGM) prior to 2003/04 and standard labour requirement thereafter, 
while the farm type classification is based on the relative importance of the various crop and 
livestock enterprises in terms of SGM.
1
   
The FAS potentially provides a rich source of information for the analysis of farm 
income mobility since farms, once recruited, can stay in the survey for an unlimited length of 
time (Scottish Government, 2012a).  However farms in the survey that experience significant 
                                                        
1
  The sampling frame excludes small farms less than 8 Economic Size Units (ESUs) prior to 
2003/04 and 0.5 Standard Labour Requirements (SLRs) thereafter; specialist livestock units 
larger than 200 ESU prior to 2003/04; and certain minor farm types (most notably 
horticulture and specialist pig and poultry farms).   
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structural change (such as amalgamation with another farm) are assigned a new identifier and 
the sample is therefore subject to a ‘virtual’ form of selective attrition that could bias mobility 
estimates.
2
  We address this problem by making use of information supplied by the data 
provider on the linkage of identifiers between years to assign a unique number to each farm 
so long as it remains in the sample.  The FAS is not informative of farm entry and exit 
processes since farms recruited to the survey are not necessarily new businesses and no 
reasons are given as to why farms leave the survey.  The analysis is based on an unbalanced 
panel of 933 farms, of which 174 were present over the whole 15 year period and with a 
median duration of 7 years.   
Probability weights are used throughout our analysis with these being based on farm 
numbers enumerated by size and type in the annual June Agricultural Census.  The weighted 
sample is therefore representative of the population of full-time farms in Scotland in each 
year, with a sampling fraction of between 3% and 4% over most of the study period.
3
  
Standard errors for all mean, inequality and mobility measures are generated using bootstrap 
procedures that reflect the sample design.  In particular, bootstrap standard errors for the 
mobility indices are obtained by the resampling of clusters within each stratification class, 
where each cluster consists of all observations on a single farm, and therefore allows for the 
possible correlation of individual farm incomes across years.  
The farm income measure used in the current study is Cash Income, which represents 
the cash return to the group with an entrepreneurial interest in the farm for their manual and 
managerial labour and on their investment in the business (Scottish Government, 2012a) and 
is defined as the difference between trading revenue (sales of livestock, livestock products, 
crops, subsidy and payments, revenue from diversified activities, etc) and trading expenditure 
(variable costs, general overheads, fuel, repairs, rent paid, paid labour, etc).
4
  Of the various 
                                                        
2
  In contrast, farms in the Farm Business Survey in England and Wales retain their unique 
number except in exceptional circumstances, such as the farm splitting into two units that 
both continue to participate in the survey, but even in this case the larger unit will retain the 
original number (cf. DEFRA, 2014). 
3
  Farms that were directly affected by foot and mouth disease culls and compensation are 
excluded from the analysis, but the resultant sub-samples for 2001/02 and 2002/03 are 
nevertheless sufficient “to give a representative picture of full-time Scottish farm businesses” 
in these years (SEERAD, 2003, 2004). 
4
  Note that cash income, unlike cash flow, does not take account of net investment spending. 
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alternative FAS indicators of farm income, Cash Income may be seen to correspond most 
closely to the farm income position as perceived by the farmer (cf. DEFRA, 2002, Appendix 
3), but it is important to recognise that it does not include non-farm sources of income about 
which FAS collects only limited information.  The analysis is conducted at the farm level 
rather than per unit of unpaid labour because of doubts concerning the relevance and 
reliability of data on the unpaid labour input in the UK context (see Hill 1991).  
The inequality measure used throughout the study is the Gini coefficient.  Let 
 ( ) 2 co v ,t it it tG y y R y  be the Gini coefficient of incomes in year t, where i ty  is the income of 
farm i (i=1,….N) in year t, 
t
y  is average income, and 
i t
R  is the farm’s relative rank in the year 
t income distribution.  ( )
t
G y  is invariant to equiproportionate changes in all incomes, taking 
a value of zero when all individual farm incomes are identical and of one when all income 
accrues to one farm and all other farms receive nothing.  The first two columns of Table 1 
report the mean and Gini coefficient of income for each production year between 1995 and 
2009.  Farm incomes fell after 1996 due to a combination of factors including a strong pound, 
weak world commodity prices and the impact of bovine spongiform encephalopathy; and 
only recovered gradually following the end of the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001. 
Indeed average incomes did not rise in nominal terms above the levels observed in 1996 
before 2007 and were only £5000 per farm higher in 2009, despite the growth in average 
farm business size – as measured in terms of total SGM, based on Scottish average gross 
margins for the years 1998 to 2002
5
 – reported in column 3.  The coefficient of variation of 
average annual incomes was 20% over the study period, but this measure of the aggregate 
instability of the income distribution as a whole may tell us little about the experience of 
individual farms, which will also be determined by the effects of the movement of farms 
within the distribution due to idiosyncratic income shocks.   Changes in the Gini coefficient 
reflect changes in both the absolute dispersion and mean level of incomes, with relative 
inequality generally higher in years of lower average incomes. 
 
                                                        
5
 SGMs are representative of the level of gross margin – enterprise output less variable costs 
– that could be expected on an average farm under ‘normal’ conditions and are calculated 
using SGM coefficients per unit area of crops and per head of livestock.  We ensure 
comparability over time by using the most recent set of SGM coefficients available to 
calculate SGMs for the entire period. 
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3.  Is farm income inequality a transitory or chronic problem?  
Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, will typically fall if income is 
measured over a longer period due to the reranking of farms within the income distribution.  
The extent of such equalization if the measurement period is extended from one to T years is 
captured by the mobility index due to Shorrocks (1978): 
1
( )
1
( )
A
T
T
t tt
G y
M
w G y

 

 (1) 
where  ( ) 2 co v ,A iA iA AG y y R y  is the Gini coefficient of individual average incomes 
1
T
iA itt
y y T

   calculated over the T-year period t=1,…,T; iAR  are the corresponding relative 
ranks; 
1
N
A iAi
y y N

   is overall average income over the entire period; and t t Aw y y  are a 
set of weights that sum to one by construction.  0
T
M   by definition if T=1.  For T>1, the 
index will equal one when longer-term incomes are exactly equalised over the measurement 
period such that the T-year Gini coefficient is equal to zero, and will equal zero in the 
absence of exchange mobility such that each farm occupies the same rank in all T annual 
income distributions.   
Hence if inequality is largely a short-run or temporary phenomenon due to transitory 
idiosyncratic income shocks then the mobility index will take a value close to one, whereas if 
inequality largely arises from long-term or permanent differences between farms then the 
index will take a value close to zero.  From this perspective, greater mobility may not favour 
risk-averse farmers if it is associated with greater uncertainty due to more pronounced 
income fluctuations, even though the equalisation of long-term incomes per se may be seen 
as a socially desirable goal.  Jantti and Jenkins (2015, p.814) observe that the Shorrocks 
index can be interpreted as a measure of risk if incomes are given as the simple sum of a 
fixed individual-level permanent component, approximated by T-year average income, and 
an idiosyncratic transitory component that is ex-ante unknown.  In practice, lower values of 
T
M  need not necessarily imply lower levels of risk due to the correlation of income shocks 
across the farm sector as a result of common factors such as price movements and weather 
conditions.   
The final column of Table 1 gives values of MT as the measurement period is 
extended from the base year of 1995, initially aggregating over the first two years for all 
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farms present in both years, then the first three years and so on.
6
  Thus the index value of 
0.057 for T=2 implies that averaging incomes over 1995 and 1996 reduces inequality by 
5.7% compared to the weighted average of the Gini coefficients for the two years.  Phimister 
et al. (2004) have previously reported an 8% fall in the Gini coefficient for Scotland over the 
period 1988 to 1999 if cash income values are calculated using rolling two-year individual 
farm averages.  MT tends to increase as the length of the measurement period is extended but 
approaches an upper limiting value of about 12% after about 10 years, with no further 
equalisation once relative incomes have approached their long-term or permanent values.  
Thus the overwhelming bulk of cross-sectional inequality, as measured by annual Gini 
coefficients, would appear to have been long-term or chronic in nature inasmuch as it 
reflected permanent differences in incomes between farms.  The choice of alternative base 
years produced broadly similar findings (not reported), with an average value for T=2 of 
6.6% over all possible base years between 1995 and 2008, and with upper limiting values in 
the range of 12% to 16%.   
 
4. Characterizing processes of inequality change  
Changes in income inequality over time in a fixed population of farms are related to the 
pattern of income growth across the income range and the reranking of farms within the 
income distribution.  In particular, following Jenkins and van Kerm (2006; see also Kakwani, 
1984), the change in the Gini coefficient from some base year s to a final year f may be 
written as:  
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )f s f f s f s s H VG y G y G y C I y R C I y R G y M M        (2) 
where  ( , ) 2 c o v ,f s f is fiC I y R y R y  is defined as the concentration index (CI) of final year 
incomes ranked by positions in the base year income distribution; and the vertical and 
horizontal mobility indices, 
V
M  and 
H
M  respectively, are discussed further below.  
VM  provides a measure of vertical mobility that addresses the question of whether the 
distribution of income changes favours farms with initially low or high incomes and thus 
provides a natural counterpart to ( )
t
G y  which addresses the distribution of income between 
                                                        
6
 Limiting the entire analysis to the 174 farms present in all 15 years leads to lower values of 
MT for small T, though the estimate of MT for T=15 is identical to that reported in Table 1 by 
construction.   
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low and high income farms.  
V
M  will be zero if expected income changes are unrelated to 
base year income and will be negative if expected income changes are equalising in relative 
terms, which will be the case if low income farms in the base year experience either larger 
relative gains on average than high income farms or smaller relative losses.  
V
M  can usefully 
be written as the product of progressivity and scale indices, P and q respectively, such that 
V
M P q .  The progressivity of income changes is captured by the disproportionality index 
 , ( )f s s sP C I y y R G y    where      , 2 co v , /ff s i is is fs sC I y y R y y R y y     is the CI of 
income changes ( )i f isy y  ranked by base year incomes.  For any given P, the gross 
redistributive effect 
V
M  is proportional to the relative magnitude of income changes as 
measured by the scale factor  f fsq y y y  .  Note that negative values of P imply that 
expected income changes will be equalising if incomes are growing on average, but diverging 
if incomes are falling.   
 2 co v ,H i f i f is fM y R R y   is the Atkinson−Plotnick reranking index, which 
captures the effect of the movement of farms within the income distribution.  
H
M  is non-
negative by definition (see Lambert, 2001), implying that any reranking that does occur has 
an adverse impact on the overall redistributive effect of the income changes.  Thus farm 
income growth will only reduce inequality if expected income changes favour lower income 
farms and the resultant vertical mobility effect is not swamped by any offsetting horizontal 
mobility effect due to the reranking of farms. 
The top panel of Table 2 presents the decomposition of annual changes in the Gini 
coefficient into vertical and horizontal components based on (2), where the results are 
generated using observations on all farms present in both the base and final year, and 
therefore are not strictly comparable either with the annual summary statistics presented in 
Table 1 or between pairs of years.  These results reveal three main points.  First, the vertical 
mobility index 
V
M  is significantly negative in all cases, indicating that expected annual 
income changes conditional upon initial income had an equalising effect throughout the 
period.  Thus farms with low incomes in one year experienced on average over the following 
year either larger relative income gains than high income farms or smaller relative losses.  
However, most of the estimates of the progressivity index P and some of the estimated scale 
factors q are not significantly different from zero.  Second, the horizontal mobility index 
H
M  
is significantly positive in all cases, reflecting the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks on 
the ranking of farms in the income distribution between successive years.  Third, the 
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equalising effect of expected income changes was only sufficient to outweigh the diverging 
impact of re-ranking in some years, with no clear trend in the level of farm income inequality 
over the entire period.  
 The finding that expected income changes were not independent of initial incomes 
needs to be treated with some caution as the apparent progressivity of farm income growth 
may simply reflect regression toward the mean if, as seems likely to some extent, individual 
farm incomes are subject to idiosyncratic shocks (or measurement errors) that are 
uncorrelated over time such that large positive (negative) shocks to income in a particular 
year are offset by slow (fast) income growth in subsequent years.
7
  We employ a number of 
alternative strategies to investigate whether the observed progressivity of income growth is in 
fact spurious. 
 First we consider multiyear rather than annual changes in income inequality on the 
assumption that extending the measurement period is likely to reduce the importance of the 
transitory component in any observed change.  The bottom panel of Table 2 presents the 
results of these multiyear decomposition analyses, which have been generated using 
observations on all farms present throughout the relevant measurement period.  We find that 
vertical mobility was significantly negative for all multi-year periods and, in particular, that 
low income farms in 1995 experienced higher average rates of income growth over the full 
study period than high income farms.  Nevertheless inequality rose over the first sub-period 
and the full period, though not over the second sub-period from 2005 to 2009. 
Our other two robustness checks employ alternative techniques to mitigate the 
potential for bias due to transitory shocks in the estimation of vertical mobility.  First we 
follow common practice in the mobility literature by measuring income as a three-year 
centred moving average to reduce the impact of transitory variability (see, e.g. Solon, 2002).  
Second, we employ the so-called ‘IV’ approach proposed by Jenkins and van Kerm (2011) to 
purge the rank variable of income shocks by replacing observations on ranks in the base year 
distribution with estimates based on ranks in the distribution of the average of one year lag 
                                                        
7
 For example, if incomes are given as the simple sum of a fixed farm-specific permanent 
component and an idiosyncratic transitory component then a farm that is subject to a positive 
(negative) income shock in one year can expect to receive a lower (higher) income in the 
following year given that the expected value of the transitory component is zero.  So, despite 
there being no association between incomes in the two years, there is a correlation between 
incomes in the first year and the subsequent changes in income.    
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and lead incomes.
8
  Table 3 presents the results of these alternative estimates of 
V
M , where 
we examine changes both over successive three-year periods and the full (truncated) study 
period.  These show that when using smoothed income data then expected income growth 
conditional on initial income is still significantly equalising in most cases, but the extent of 
vertical mobility is typically reduced somewhat.  Conversely only three of the ‘IV’ estimates 
of 
V
M  are significantly different from zero, one negative and two positive, which might 
suggest that neither low nor high income farms were systematically favoured by the pattern 
of income changes.   
In conclusion the findings provide some evidence against the hypothesis that expected 
income changes were independent of initial incomes although the results of the robustness 
tests are not unequivocal.  In particular, it would appear that transitory shocks are unlikely to 
account for all of the observed bias of annual income growth rates in favour of lower income 
farms conditional upon survival.   
 
4.1 To what extent has vertical mobility been driven by changes in farm business size? 
Bakucs et al. (2103) observe that empirical research on the relationship between farm size 
and farm growth has yielded rather contradictory results, with a number of studies (e.g. 
Shapiro et al. 1987; Weiss, 1999) having found evidence that smaller farms tend to grow 
faster than larger ones.  This sub-section extends the preceding analysis by considering the 
extent to which observed levels of vertical income mobility might have been driven by 
changes in farm business size.  Specifically, we follow the empirical strategy adopted in 
Allanson and Petrie (2013) to identify the determinants of vertical mobility by estimating a 
dynamic model of individual farm incomes.  We first consider the specification of the 
dynamic model before showing how the estimates may be used in the decomposition of the 
vertical mobility index 
V
M . 
                                                        
8
  This is not a conventional instrumental variables approach, though Jenkins and van Kerm 
(2011) argue that it is analogous to one.  Given that ( , ) ( )fV s syM C I R G y  , ( , )f syC I R  and 
( )
s
G y  can each be estimated using the ‘convenient regression approach’ of Kakwani et al. 
(1997) as the response coefficient from a simple regression of a normalised measure of 
income on base year rank, with the so-called ‘IV’ procedure intended to eliminate possible 
correlation between the ‘explanatory’ rank variable and the ‘error term’ in this regression.   
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Let  ; ; ;t it t ip z    be the income-generating potential of farm i (i=1,  … N) in year t 
(t=1,  … T), where 
t
p is a vector of input and output prices that are assumed to be common 
across farms; 
it
z  represents farm business size; 
t
  the state of technology common to all 
farms; and 
i
  captures unobservable factors - such as land quality - that may be assumed to 
be constant by farm over the study period.   Assuming a simple linear functional form with 
interaction terms
9
 and replacing the common time-varying factors, prices and technology, by 
annual dummies yields the target income function:   
 
*
0 1 2 3
; ; ;
it t it t i t t it t t it i
y p z d z d z             ;       t=1,…T (3) 
 Observed farm incomes 
i t
y  may be expected to diverge from target incomes 
*
i t
y  due 
to both farm production system adjustment costs and the influence of transitory idiosyncratic 
shocks.  Accordingly we incorporate (3) into a first-order Error Correction Model (ECM):   
   
     
*
, 1 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1
0 1 1 2 , 1 2 3 , 1
0 1 , 1 2 , 1
1, ;  1; ,  1
i t i t i t i t t t i t i t i t i t
i t t t t i t t t i t i t i t
i t t i t t i t i t i t
y y y z d z y y
d d z d z y
z z y i N t T
   
            
    
    
 
 
         
         
       
 (4) 
where  
*
it it
y y  corresponds to the ‘equilibrium error’ in the current period and 
 0 1    determines the rate of adjustment to equilibrium.  Hence, annual changes in 
income depend on the effects of contemporaneous changes in farm business size 
, 1i t
z

 , 
where the size of these effects may vary between years; the initial extent of any 
disequilibrium in income; and the size of the idiosyncratic income shock 
, 1i t


.   
The ECM is obtained as a reparameterisation of the first-order autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model, which nests the partial adjustment, first-order autoregressive 
and static models as special cases.  For analytical purposes, the main attraction of this 
dynamic specification is the clear distinction between the short-run dynamics and the implied 
long-run income relationship.  In particular, it is possible using the ECM to identify both the 
short-term impact on farm income inequality due to contemporaneous changes in farm 
business size and also which factors contribute to equilibrium or structural inequality.   
                                                        
9
 The specification could be extended to include higher-order terms in 
it
z but these proved to 
be insignificant in the empirical application.  
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With respect to the determinants of vertical mobility between consecutive periods, it 
is readily shown (see Allanson and Petrie, 2013) that if f=s+1 then 
V
M  in (2) may be 
decomposed using (4) to yield: 
 
 
 
 
1
____ _ _ _ _
*
*
^
( , ) ( )
^ ^ ^
^
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
E q E E q E
fs
V z z e e f s s
f
fs s
s s s s f s s
f f
z
M P q P q P q P q C I z R G y
y
y y
C I y y R G y C I e R G y
y y

 
 

      

    
 (5) 
where a hat over a variable or parameter indicates that it is an estimate and a bar denotes a 
sample mean, such that fz ,  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
*^
s s
y y and ^ f are respectively the average change in farm 
business size, mean predicted equilibrium error and regression residual, with 
( , ) 2 c o v ( , ) ff s i f isC I z R z R z    ,     
__ _ _ _ _ _ _
* * *^ ^ ^( , ) 2 c o v ,
s s s is is is s s
C I y y R y y R y y     and 
^^ ^( , ) 2 c o v ( , ) ff i fs isC I R R    being the corresponding CI’s ranked by base year income.   
Hence 
V
M  is given in (5) as the sum of contributions due to changes in farm business 
size, the predicted equilibrium error and contemporaneous income shocks, where each 
contribution is expressed in terms of the scale and progressivity of the income changes due to 
that factor.  The intuitive interpretation is that a factor can only contribute to vertical mobility 
V
M  if it is statistically associated with changes in income and the distribution of those 
changes among high and low income farms is different from the initial distribution of 
income.  In particular, vertical mobility due to farm business growth 
z z
P q
 
will be equalising 
if farm business growth is positively associated with farm income growth and a larger share 
of the resultant income gains accrue to low income farms than their base year share of 
income, such that 
z
q

is positive and 
z
P

negative.  Similarly the contribution of the ‘error 
correction’ mechanism to vertical mobility 
E q E E q E
P q will depend on the scale and progressivity 
of the resultant income changes,
10
 where the process of adjustment towards equilibrium or 
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E q E E q E
P q  in (5) could be further broken down using (3) to identify the ‘apparent’ 
contribution of farm business size zs to VM  through the disequilibrium adjustment process as 
( ) ( ) 2
^( , ) ( ) /( )( )E q E z E q E z s s fss sqP C I z R y yG z  .  But this would be misleading as the causes of the 
base year equilibrium error are unknown: for example, the disequilibrium may have arisen 
due to prior changes in prices or technology not farm business size.  
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target income levels may generally be expected to have a negative impact on 
V
M  and hence 
reduce inequality.
11
 
We extend this decomposition analysis to consider the determinants of vertical 
mobility over a multiyear period.  Thus, if f=s+m with m>1 then income changes over this 
period can be expressed in terms of the dynamic income model as:   
 
*
if is i is is i i i
y y y y             (6) 
where:    
( 1 )1
1 , , 1 , 2 ,
1 0
1 1
m km
m k j
i s m i s m s k s i s k
k j
z z    
 

   
 
  
          
  
  ; 
 
1
1
m
m k
k
 


   ;      ,
1
1
m
m k
i i s k
k
 



   ; 
      
1
1, 1 , 2 , 2 ,
1
1
m
m k
i s k s s k s is
k
z    


 

        
   
( 1 )1
2 , ( 1 ) 2 ,
1 0
1
m km
j
i s k j s i s k
k j
z  
 
   
 
 
     
 
   
and which reduces to (4) if m=1 with s≡t.  Hence (5) may be generalised to give: 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _
*
*
_ _ _ _
^ ^^
^ ^
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
^ ^
^ ^ ^
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ,
m m m m m m m m m m
V z z E q E E q E e e z z
s s
s s s s s s
f f
s s s s
f f
M P q P q P q P q P q P q
y y
C I R G y C I y y R G y
y y
C I R G y C I R G y C I R
y y
       
     
           
   
   
    
          
   
   
_ _
^
) ( )
s s
f
G y
y
  
 
 
 
 (7) 
where 
^
 , 
^
 , 
^
 , 
^
  and 
^
  are estimates of the corresponding entities in (6), with mean values 
denoted by bars.  Therefore, vertical mobility in any given multiyear period is determined, as 
before, by the (cumulative) effects of changes in farm business size over the period, the 
equilibrium error in the base year and the sequence of idiosyncratic shocks to farm incomes.  
But if m>2 there are two additional terms that also have to be taken into consideration, which 
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 It can be shown that        
* *^ ^ ^, /E q E E q E fs s s sP q C I y R G y y y   where  
^
*,
s s
C I y R  is the CI of 
predicted equilibrium income ranked by actual incomes in the base year.  Typically we would 
expect  
^
*, ( ) 0
s s s
C I y R G y   since    
^ ^
* *,
s s s
C I y R G y  by definition (see Lambert, 2001, 
p.29), where  
*^
s
G y  is the Gini of predicted equilibrium incomes, and    
*^
s s
G y G y  due to 
the disequalising effect of transitory shocks to annual incomes. 
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capture the effect of changes in the target income function (3) due to changing prices and 
technology (as reflected in the time-varying parameters in (4)) and the interaction between 
farm business size and price/technology changes. 
Table 4 reports the results from the estimation of the ECM, with the dependent 
variable being the annual change in cash income and farm business size measured in terms of 
total standard gross margin (SGM), based on Scottish average gross margins for the years 
1998 to 2002.  OLS estimates of (4) will be biased due to the correlation between lagged 
income and the fixed effects in the error term (see Bond, 2002, for a discussion).  To 
overcome this problem we follow Mundlak (1978) by explicitly modelling the fixed effects 
as a function of farm-specific SGM averages, and further control for initial conditions in the 
manner of Wooldridge (2005) by including as a separate explanatory variable the level of 
income in the year in which a farm first entered the sample.  This estimation strategy has the 
appeal that it provides explicit estimates of the farm-specific fixed effects, which will prove 
informative in the decomposition of equilibrium inequality, and avoids the further restriction 
of the sample that would result from the use of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimators as these require higher-order lags of income to serve as instruments.
12
  The 
preferred specification imposes the restriction that 
1 1t
   for all t, i.e. that the immediate 
impact of changes in farm business size is constant over the study period.
13
  
The first set of columns report the estimates of the dynamic income model (4).  Thus 
the short-run or impact effect of a £1 increase in the SGM of a farm business was to increase 
cash incomes by 19.5 pence.  The remainder of the dynamic income function relates to the 
equilibrium error, where the coefficient on lagged income provides an estimate of the 
adjustment parameter 
^
  equal to 0.51, implying that just over half of the gap between any 
farm’s actual and target income in one year was closed by the next year.  Dividing the 
coefficients on the lagged determinants of income by 
^
  yields the parameters of the implied 
                                                        
12
  The preferred estimator yields an estimate of the adjustment parameter λ between those of 
the downwardly biased OLS estimator and the upwardly biased within-groups estimator.  In 
contrast, Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimates of λ were 
both less than the OLS estimate and close to zero. 
13
 The set of annual slope dummies on the farm business size change variable is only just 
significant at the 5% level (F=1.79; F(13,6365,5%)=1.72), unlike both the intercept dummies 
(F(13,6365)=3.01) and farm size slope dummies (F(13,6365)=6.33). 
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equilibrium or target income function (3), which are reported in the second set of columns.  
Taking the reference year of 1995 as an example, the implied long-run effect of a £1 increase 
in SGM was 45.4 pence given prevailing agroeconomic conditions, or more than twice as 
large as the impact effect.  Long-run income effects of changes in farm business size are 
predicted to have been positive in all years, being on average 1.8 times the impact effect.  
Finally, farm-level fixed effects are not significantly affected by the average business size of 
the farm but there is a significant positive relationship with the level of income in the year in 
which the farm first entered the sample. 
Table 5 expands upon the results of the decomposition analysis in Table 2, identifying 
the separate contributions of farm business size changes, the initial equilibrium error, the 
residual, price changes, and the interaction between farm size and price changes to the 
vertical mobility index MV.  First, changes in farm business size made contributions to annual 
vertical mobility that were both negligible and statistically insignificant in all years.  
Moreover this continues to be the case even when considering vertical mobility over 
multiyear periods, where these multiyear estimates take into account not only the 
contemporaneous effects of farm business size changes but also the lagged effects operating 
through the error correction mechanism.  Accordingly, the results provide no evidence that 
the pattern of income changes due to farm business growth over the study period was biased 
in favour of either low or high income farms.   
Second the contribution of the equilibrium error in the base year to vertical mobility is 
significantly negative in every year, which is consistent with our expectation based on the 
discussion of (5).  More intuitively, the process of adjustment towards equilibrium or target 
incomes is equalizing with large positive (negative) shocks to income in a particular year 
offset by slow (fast) income growth in subsequent years.  The correction of the initial 
equilibrium error accounts, on average, for all of the vertical mobility associated with annual 
income changes over the period, providing an explanation of how income growth could 
appear to be biased in favour of lower income farms in spite of the finding that the income 
effect of farm business growth was not.  
Third, the contribution of the residual offsets the equalising effect of the equilibrium 
error in some years and reinforces it in others, though the effect is not significant in any 
single year and is roughly equal to zero on average over the full set of annual changes. This 
lack of systematic contribution to vertical mobility is to be expected given that the residual 
allows for the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to farm incomes after controlling for both farm-
15 
 
specific fixed effects and year-specific price effects.  By construction the residual is 
uncorrelated with lagged income over the full panel.  
Finally, the effect of the common time-varying factors in the multiyear 
decompositions was diverging in the first sub-period over which average incomes fell and 
significantly equalising in the second when they rose sharply (see Table 1), consistent with 
the earlier finding that relative inequality was generally higher in years of lower average 
incomes.  By implication, the cash incomes of the higher income farms were 
disproportionately affected by changes in the economic fortunes of the agricultural sector, 
benefiting more in relative terms from upturns but losing more in downturns.  The effect of 
the interaction term was trivial and insignificant throughout. 
 
4.2 Equilibrium or structural inequality 
Finally we note that the ECM implies a measure of equilibrium or target income 
*
i t
y  in year t 
(t=1,…T−1) conditional upon prices, technology and farm business size.  Hence inequality in 
*
i t
y  may be interpreted as a measure of equilibrium or structural inequality, which may be 
compared with the observed inequality of annual farm incomes and used to identify which 
factors contribute to structural inequality. 
By analogy with the Shorrocks index 
T
M , we propose a measure that reflects the 
degree to which observed annual incomes are equalized in the implied equilibrium.  
Specifically, if 
^ ^ ^ ^*^ ^
0 1 2 3i t t t i t t t i t i
y d z d z          is the predicted level of equilibrium 
income in year t given the derived set of parameter estimates of (3), then we define the 
following set of disequilibrium adjustment mobility indices: 
 
 
^
*
1
t t
D A
t
G y
M
G y
  ;        t=1,…T−1 (8) 
where the Gini coefficient of predicted equilibrium incomes    
^^ ^ * ** * ^2 c o v , /t i t i t tG y y R y  is 
interpreted as a measure of structural inequality; *^
t
y  is average predicted equilibrium income; 
and 
^ *
i t
R  is the individual’s relative rank in the predicted equilibrium income distribution.  
t
D A
M  will equal one when there is no structural inequality, in which case  
^
* 0
t
G y  , and will 
equal zero if actual and equilibrium incomes are identical, in which case    
^
*
t t
G y G y .  
Hence, as with the Shorrocks index 
T
M , the disequilibrium adjustment mobility index will 
take values close to one if inequality is largely a short-run phenomenon due to transitory 
peturbations from equilibrium, whereas if inequality largely arises from structural differences 
between farms then the index will take values close to zero.   
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 Table 6 reports the equilibrium Gini coefficient estimates for each year where these 
are smaller than the corresponding annual Gini coefficients (repeated from Table 1) in all 
years except 2005, which is consistent with the finding that averaging income over a number 
of years typically reduces inequality.  Accordingly, the disequilibrium adjustment indices 
t
D A
M  take values in the unit interval in all years but 2005, with an average value of 29.1% 
over the entire period indicating that a significant proportion of the inequality in annual 
incomes in any year was due to the incidence and persistence of idiosyncratic shocks.  This 
estimate of the potential for the equalisation of incomes in the longer term is more than twice 
as high as the limiting Shorrocks Index MT value of 12% for the entire period, where the 
difference may be ascribed to the alternative definitions of “longer term” incomes employed 
in the construction of the two indices.  Nevertheless both measures do imply that the 
overwhelming fraction of farm income inequality is permanent or structural in nature. 
Finally, the determinants of structural inequality may be obtained using regression-
based procedures (see, e.g., Morduch and Sicular, 2002) to decompose the Gini coefficient of 
predicted equilibrium incomes:   
^ ^ ^ ^^ ^* * * * * *^^ ^
0 1 2 3
^ ^^ ^* *^
^ ^ ^ ^* *^2 3
2 3 * ** *
^ ^
^
^ ^^ ^
( ) 2 c o v ( , ) 2 c o v ( , )
2 c o v ( , ) 2 c o v ( , ) ( )
( ) ( , ) ( , )
/ /
t i t i t t t t i t t t i t i i t t
i t i t i i t t t
t t t t
t tt t
G y y R y d z d z R y
z R R z
C I z R C I R
y yy y
    
   
  
     

    
; t=1,..T−1 (9)
 
where 
^ *
( , )
t t
C I z R  is the CI of farm business size ranked by predicted equilibrium income in 
year t, with corresponding average value 
t
z ; and 
^ *^
( , )
t
C I R  and ^  are the corresponding 
statistics for the farm-specific fixed-effect term.  Hence the Gini coefficient is given as a 
weighted sum of CIs, with the weight on each CI equal to the share of predicted equilibrium 
income attributable to that factor where this is given by the elasticity of equilibrium income 
with respect to that factor evaluated at the means. The intuitive interpretation is that a factor 
can only contribute to structural inequality if the factor is statistically associated with 
equilibrium income and concentrated among either high or low income farms. 
 The remainder of Table 6 provides results from the analysis of the determinants of 
structural inequality.  On average, just under two thirds (64.6%) of structural inequality in 
farm incomes was due to observable differences in the size of farm businesses, as measured 
in terms of standard gross margin: larger farm businesses tended to generate higher cash 
incomes so farm business size is a source of income inequality.  This leaves the remaining 
third (35.4%) of structural inequality attributable to farm-level fixed effects, where these 
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effects make a statistically significant contribution in some years.  This may seem a 
surprisingly high proportion until it is remembered what the fixed effects represent.  Firstly 
they allow for a multitude of factors - most notably land quality and managerial ability - that 
affect farms’ financial performance but are hard to measure and therefore not explicitly 
controlled for in the model: empirical analyses of farm enterprise performance (e.g. Scottish 
Government, 2012b) provide ample evidence of the considerable variation in returns 
achieved by Scottish farmers.  Secondly, they also allow for differences in workforce 
composition and land ownership between farms, which will affect the cash incomes of farms 
but are not taken into account in the calculation of SGMs.  Thus equilibrium or structural 
inequality is not only due to differences in the economic size of farms as conventionally 
measured but also in their cash income generating performance. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper provides a thorough evaluation of the distributional consequences of farm income 
mobility in Scotland between 1995 and 2009 using a range of mobility indices to explore two 
distinct but interrelated issues: the extent to which farm income inequality is a chronic as 
opposed to a temporary phenomenon; the nature of the dynamic processes driving changes in 
farm income inequality over time.  The empirical study is based on an unbalanced panel of 
FAS farm records in which each farm was assigned a unique identifier for the whole of the 
time it remained in the survey in order to fully capture income mobility within the sample.  
Cash income was chosen as the FAS farm income indicator that corresponds most closely to 
the farm income position as perceived by the farmer. 
The empirical results reveal that farm income inequality was partly a temporary or 
short-run phenomenon, with the estimates of the Shorrocks and disequilibrium adjustment 
mobility indices implying that somewhere between 12% and 30% of inequality in annual 
incomes may have been due to the incidence and persistence of idiosyncratic shocks.  Farm 
income instability would likely have been higher but for the substantial role played by Pillar 
1 direct payments in reducing the exposure of farms to market and production risk 
(Tangermann, 2011; Hennessy, 2014).  However, it remains to be shown formally that such 
payments would also have had the effect of reducing the degree to which farm incomes are 
equalised in the longer term, which remains a topic for further research.  The most recent 
CAP reform included a new income stabilisation tool as part of a ‘risk management toolkit’ 
under Pillar 2, which would allow for the compensation of farmers who experience a severe 
drop in their incomes (European Commission, 2013).  However the Scottish Government 
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(2015, p.744) has chosen not to implement this provision on the grounds that it is more 
appropriate for basic levels of income protection to be provided through Pillar 1 measures.   
The overwhelming proportion of farm income inequality was, however, permanent or 
structural in nature.  Roughly two thirds of the structural inequality is further shown, on 
average, to have been due to differences in farm business size, with the remainder due to 
farm-level fixed effects that represent differences in both financial performance and business 
structure.  Within Scotland, the move from historic to area-based direct payments in the new 
CAP will inevitably redistribute support in future from farms with more intensive enterprises 
towards those with more extensive systems (see, e.g., Vosough Ahmadi et al., 2014).  
However the Scottish Government has sought to limit the resultant scale of farm income 
redistribution by adopting a regionalised model in which regional payment rates reflect the 
productive capacity of land (Scottish Government, 2014).  The Scottish Government also 
chose not to adopt the redistributive payment scheme, which could potentially have done 
more to tackle the unequal distribution of farm income than the modulation and capping of 
direct payments to larger farms (cf. Matthews, 2013). 
Finally, the empirical findings provide mixed evidence on whether or not the 
proportional rate of farm income growth was independent of farm income.  The raw estimates 
of vertical mobility indicate that farm income growth conditional upon farm survival was 
higher on average on lower income farms, with a battery of robustness tests largely serving to 
validate this result.  However, the further analysis of the determinants of vertical mobility 
reveal that the equalizing effect of expected income changes was almost entirely due to the 
process of adjustment towards equilibrium or target incomes conditional upon prices, 
technology and farm business size.  In contrast, the decomposition results provide no 
evidence that relative income growth due to farm business size changes was associated with 
initial incomes.  Further work is required on the impact of farm entry and exit processes to 
evaluate fully the effects of changes in the farm business size structure on the evolution of the 
farm income distribution. 
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Table 1.  Basic summary statistics and Shorrocks mobility index MT 
 Annual summary 
statistics 
 Multiyear analysis 
  Base year =1995 
Year 
t
y  
 
(£) 
 ( )tG y   
Mean total 
farm SGM 
(£) 
  T ( )AG y   MT  
1995 40489 *** 0.505 *** 55154 ***  1 0.505 *** 0  
 1724  0.017  2248    0.017  -  
1996 43707 *** 0.447 *** 56746 ***  2 0.442 *** 0.057 *** 
 1372  0.015  2109    0.014  0.017  
1997 27644 *** 0.512 *** 57942 ***  3 0.442 *** 0.067 *** 
 995  0.019  2250    0.013  0.010  
1998 30008 *** 0.495 *** 59471 ***  4 0.446 *** 0.065 *** 
 1208  0.018  2238    0.014  0.009  
1999 27161 *** 0.594 *** 61950 ***  5 0.452 *** 0.069 *** 
 1507  0.034  2482    0.015  0.009  
2000 28934 *** 0.545 *** 61666 ***  6 0.456 *** 0.086 *** 
 1536  0.023  3092    0.015  0.012  
2001 28874 *** 0.546 *** 56897 ***  7 0.457 *** 0.097 *** 
 1187  0.022  2185    0.017  0.012  
2002 31196 *** 0.502 *** 67294 ***  8 0.470 *** 0.089 *** 
 1445  0.022  3207    0.019  0.015  
2003 36414 *** 0.460 *** 63544 ***  9 0.450 *** 0.099 *** 
 1343  0.018  2555    0.029  0.021  
2004 36576 *** 0.478 *** 65239 ***  10 0.444 *** 0.103 *** 
 1227  0.018  2280    0.031  0.021  
2005 31654 *** 0.486 *** 64584 *** 
 
11 0.411 *** 0.138 *** 
 1146  0.019  2495    0.022  0.022  
2006 35168 *** 0.539 *** 66498 ***  12 0.422 *** 0.105 *** 
 1596  0.022  2839    0.027  0.022  
2007 46891 *** 0.537 *** 66772 ***  13 0.418 *** 0.116 *** 
 2040  0.020  2952    0.027  0.023  
2008 47087 *** 0.512 *** 69687 ***  14 0.421 *** 0.119 *** 
 1777  0.016  2929    0.026  0.019  
2009 48935 *** 0.480 *** 70570 ***  15 0.417 *** 0.121 *** 
 1731  0.017  3689    0.029  0.021  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on (1).  Annual summary statistics based on the full 
sample available in the relevant year.  Multiyear analysis statistics are based on the sample 
of farms present in all T years of the relevant measurement period (e.g. 1995-2009 for 
T=15).  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based on 1000 replications.  Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Table 2.  Decomposition of changes in the annual Gini coefficient over selected periods 
Period ( )sG y   ( )fG y   Change  MV  P  q  MR  
1995-1996 0.485 *** 0.452 *** -0.033 ** -0.123 *** -1.580   0.078 *** 0.090 *** 
 0.015   0.016   0.015   0.017   8.696   0.028   0.021   
1996-1997 0.431 *** 0.492 *** 0.061 *** -0.031 ** 0.054 ** -0.571 *** 0.092 *** 
 0.012   0.015   0.016   0.014   0.025   0.042   0.009   
1997-1998 0.515 *** 0.511 *** -0.004   -0.115 *** -1.890   0.061   0.111 *** 
 0.020   0.020   0.023   0.028   164.962   0.038   0.017   
1998-1999 0.493 *** 0.542 *** 0.049 *** -0.056 *** 0.657   -0.086 ** 0.105 *** 
 0.019   0.020   0.017   0.020   3.428   0.037   0.014   
1999-2000 0.616 *** 0.548 *** -0.068 *** -0.222 *** -3.328   0.067  0.155 *** 
 0.023   0.019   0.025   0.030   59.292   0.048   0.026   
2000-2001 0.536 *** 0.554 *** 0.018   -0.172 *** -2.553   0.067  0.190 *** 
 0.024   0.022   0.031   0.037   35.223   0.051   0.026   
2001-2002 0.556 *** 0.525 *** -0.031 *** -0.187 *** 4.083   -0.046   0.155 *** 
 0.023   0.021   0.024   0.027   64.129   0.038   0.019   
2002-2003 0.477 *** 0.465 *** -0.012   -0.135 ** -0.690 *** 0.195 *** 0.122 *** 
 0.024   0.018   0.020   0.038   0.191   0.032   0.027   
2003-2004 0.458 *** 0.465 *** 0.007   -0.115 *** 1.557   -0.074 ** 0.122 *** 
 0.018   0.020   0.016   0.021   421.861   0.035   0.017   
2004-2005 0.473 *** 0.490 *** 0.017   -0.106 *** 0.647 ** -0.164 *** 0.123 *** 
 0.017   0.019   0.016   0.021   0.271   0.036   0.014   
2005-2006 0.487 *** 0.532 *** 0.045 ** -0.093 *** -0.978   0.096 *** 0.138 *** 
 0.019   0.021   0.020   0.024   2.089   0.035   0.016   
2006-2007 0.538 *** 0.528 *** -0.010   -0.141 *** -0.566 *** 0.250 *** 0.131 *** 
 0.023   0.020   0.024   0.027   0.147   0.034   0.016   
2007-2008 0.527 *** 0.512 *** -0.014   -0.152 *** 5.250   -0.029   0.138 *** 
 0.021   0.017   0.017   0.021   95.404   0.038   0.016   
2008-2009 0.515 *** 0.482 *** -0.034 ** -0.162 *** -13.515   0.012   0.129 *** 
 0.016   0.016   0.016   0.018   297.357   0.029   0.012   
1995-2009 0.472 *** 0.532 *** 0.060 ** -0.112 *** -1.784   0.063  0.172 *** 
 0.022   0.027   0.027   0.030   39.819   0.046   0.022   
1995-2004 0.481 *** 0.545 *** 0.064 ** -0.107 *** 0.373 *** -0.288 *** 0.172 *** 
 0.017   0.027   0.028   0.028   0.123   0.056   0.019   
2005-2009 0.486 *** 0.483 *** -0.003   -0.145 *** -0.471 *** 0.309 *** 0.142 *** 
 0.022   0.020   0.021   0.022   0.074   0.025   0.017   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on (2).  Each statistic is based the sample of farms that 
are present in all years of the relevant period.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based 
on 1000 replications.  Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, 
** and * respectively. 
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Table 3.  Alternative estimates of MV over selected periods 
 Estimation technique 
Period Standard   Smoothed incomes  ‘Instrumented’ ranks  
1996-1999 0.030 * -0.014  0.069 *** 
 0.018  0.014  0.021  
1997-2000 -0.103 *** 0.009  0.018  
 0.035  0.014  0.028  
1998-2001 -0.104 *** -0.078 *** -0.051  
 0.036  0.024  0.041  
1999-2002 -0.171 *** -0.065 *** -0.061 ** 
 0.033  0.020  0.030  
2000-2003 -0.193 *** -0.080 *** -0.003  
 0.038  0.021  0.031  
2001-2004 -0.169 *** -0.072 *** -0.015  
 0.021  0.012  0.026  
2002-2005 -0.078 * -0.022  -0.029  
 0.046  0.025  0.030  
2003-2006 -0.013  -0.015  0.065 ** 
 0.030  0.017  0.027  
2004-2007 -0.125 *** -0.015  0.012  
 0.030  0.014  0.022  
2005-2008 -0.104 *** -0.055 *** 0.000  
 0.025  0.017  0.020  
1996-2008 -0.005  -0.051 ** 0.028  
  0.028  0.026  0.038  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on (2).  Each statistic is based on the sample of farms 
that are present in all years from the year before the base year to the year after the final 
year of each period (e.g. 1995 to 2000 for the first period 1996-1999) to allow construction 
of the smoothed income and ‘instrumented’ rank variables.  The need to generate lags and 
leads limits the analysis to the period 1996-2008, with the three year intervals chosen to 
avoid overlap in the construction of base and final year measures.  Bootstrapped standard 
errors in italics based on 1000 replications.  Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Table 4.  Dynamic income model results and the implied equilibrium income function 
  
Error Correction Model (4)  Target income function (3) 
Explanatory variables 
 
Coeff. 
 
      Robust  
Std error 
 Coeff. Bootstrapped   
Std error 
Change in SGM 
, 1i t
z


 
0.195 *** 0.074  -  
Lagged income 
it
y  -0.512 *** 0.028  - 
 
Lagged SGM 
it
z  0.233 *** 0.079  0.454 *** 0.143 
Dummy1996*
it
z   -0.184 *** 0.062  -0.360 *** 0.111 
Dummy1997*
it
z   -0.076   0.063  -0.148   0.115 
Dummy1998*
it
z   -0.092   0.063  -0.179   0.116 
Dummy1999*
it
z   -0.081   0.067  -0.158   0.123 
Dummy2000*
it
z   -0.024   0.075  -0.046   0.130 
Dummy2001*
it
z   -0.155 ** 0.064  -0.303 *** 0.114 
Dummy2002*
it
z   0.027   0.064  0.054   0.114 
Dummy2003*
it
z   -0.115   0.074  -0.224 * 0.133 
Dummy2004*
it
z   -0.150 ** 0.066  -0.293 ** 0.118 
Dummy2005*
it
z   0.075   0.087  0.147   0.156 
Dummy2006*
it
z   0.157   0.113  0.308   0.205 
Dummy2007*
it
z   -0.084   0.081  -0.163   0.146 
Dummy2008*
it
z   -0.041   0.071  -0.081   0.129 
Intercept  7047 ** 2878  13770 *** 5209 
Dummy1996   -6246 ** 3126  -12205 ** 5701 
Dummy1997   -5082   3114  -9930 * 5737 
Dummy1998   -7750 ** 3116  -15144 ** 5916 
Dummy1999   -4117   3294  -8044   6124 
Dummy2000   -5296   3827  -10349   6692 
Dummy2001   785   3236  1534   5892 
Dummy2002   -5286   3246  -10330 * 5863 
Dummy2003   757   3942  1478   7169 
Dummy2004   -2081   3379  -4066   6084 
Dummy2005   -12068 ** 5049  -23583 *** 9128 
Dummy2006   -8005   7016  -15642   12598 
Dummy2007   2053   4606  4011   8320 
Dummy2008   960   3886  1875  7071 
Farm-specific average SGM 
.i
z  -0.035   0.052  -0.069   0.098 
Income in sample entry year e n tr y
i
y  0.160 *** 0.021  0.312 *** 0.035 
Sample size  6412       
R
2  0.288       
F(31,6380)  34.42 ***      
Source: Authors’ estimates based on full unbalanced panel.  Robust standard errors allow for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 
replications.  Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
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Table 5.  Decomposition of vertical mobility MV  
 
MV 
Contribution to vertical mobility MV 
Period 
Change 
in farm 
business size 
Base year 
equilibrium 
error Residual 
Change  
in common 
time-varying 
factors 
Interaction 
term 
1995-1996 −0.1229 *** −0.0014   −0.1174 *** −0.0041 -  -  
 0.0169  0.0022   0.0254  0.0183 -  -   
1996-1997 −0.0306 ** −0.0003   −0.0164 −0.0139 -  -   
 0.0141  0.0024   0.0167  0.0165  -  -   
1997-1998 −0.1151 ***  0.0018   −0.1135 *** −0.0034  -  -   
 0.0283  0.0020   0.0225   0.0250  -  -   
1998-1999 −0.0564 *** −0.0027   −0.0564 *** 0.0026  -  -   
 0.0205  0.0054   0.0184  0.0185  -  -   
1999-2000 −0.2225 *** −0.0024   −0.1907 *** −0.0294  -  -   
 0.0295  0.0032   0.0305   0.0209  -  -   
2000-2001 −0.1723 ***  0.0095   −0.1693 *** −0.0125 -  -   
 0.0372  0.0076   0.0374  0.0310 -  -   
2001-2002 −0.1866 ***  0.0060   −0.2216 *** 0.0290 -  -  
 0.0273  0.0082   0.0292  0.0287 -  -  
2002-2003 −0.1349 *** −0.0009   −0.1377 *** 0.0037 -  -  
 0.0383  0.0021   0.0261  0.0287 -  -  
2003-2004 −0.1148 *** −0.0018   −0.1484 *** 0.0354 -  -  
 0.0211  0.0018   0.0282  0.0255 -  -  
2004-2005 −0.1061 ***  0.0004   −0.1273 *** 0.0208 -  -  
 0.0210  0.0034   0.0237  0.0261 -  -  
2005-2006 −0.0934 ***  0.0009   −0.0953 *** 0.0009 -  -  
 0.0240  0.0027   0.0363  0.0290 -  -  
2006-2007 −0.1412 *** −0.0027   −0.1431 *** 0.0045 -  -  
 0.0273  0.0026   0.0463  0.0384 -  -  
2007-2008 −0.1518 ***  0.0007   −0.1705 *** 0.0179 -  -  
 0.0207  0.0018   0.0320  0.0264 -  -  
2008-2009 −0.1620 ***  0.0026   −0.1702 *** 0.0055 -  -  
 0.0181  0.0023   0.0228  0.0192  -  -  
1995-2009 −0.1124 *** −0.0190   −0.2175 *** 0.0937 * 0.0256  0.0048   
 0.0303   0.0199   0.0543  0.0537  0.0516  0.0066   
1995-2004 −0.1074 *** −0.0110   −0.3134 *** 0.1318 ** 0.0817  0.0034   
 0.0280   0.0153   0.0704  0.0594  0.0673   0.0054   
2005-2009 −0.1454 *** 0.0071   −0.1329 ** 0.1485 *** −0.1665 *** −0.0016  
 0.0220   0.0111   0.0555  0.0340  0.0512   0.0043   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eqs. (5) and (7).  Sample definitions as given in Table 
2.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based on 1000 replications.  Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Table 6.  Disequilibrium adjustment mobility and the determinants of structural inequality 
 
Equilibrium 
inequality
*
( )
t
G y  
Observed 
inequality
( )
t
G y  
Disequilibrium 
adjustment 
mobility 
MDA 
 Contribution to structural 
inequality 
*
( )
t
G y  
Year 
 Farm business 
size 
Fixed Effects 
1995 0.312 *** 0.505 *** 0.382 ***  0.222 *** 0.089 * 
 0.046   0.018   0.090    0.065   0.054   
1996 0.417 *** 0.447 *** 0.065    0.126  0.291 * 
 0.060   0.015   0.137    0.163   0.152   
1997 0.376 *** 0.512 *** 0.265 ***  0.241 ** 0.135   
 0.035   0.019   0.075    0.094   0.084   
1998 0.456 *** 0.495 *** 0.077    0.283 ** 0.173   
 0.044   0.018   0.089    0.127   0.112   
1999 0.367 *** 0.594 *** 0.382 ***  0.234 ** 0.133   
 0.044   0.063   0.087    0.107   0.084   
2000 0.394 *** 0.545 *** 0.277 ***  0.288 *** 0.106   
 0.048   0.023   0.096    0.077   0.073   
2001 0.246 *** 0.546 *** 0.550 ***  0.100  0.146 ** 
 0.037   0.023   0.070    0.075   0.067   
2002 0.408 *** 0.502 *** 0.186 ***  0.323 *** 0.085   
 0.030   0.023   0.061    0.079   0.067   
2003 0.262 *** 0.460 *** 0.430 ***  0.143 * 0.119 * 
 0.049   0.019   0.108    0.081   0.064   
2004 0.282 *** 0.478 *** 0.411 ***  0.134  0.148 * 
 0.046   0.018   0.096    0.099   0.087   
2005 0.525 *** 0.486 *** -0.079    0.447 *** 0.078   
 0.094   0.019   0.194    0.148   0.080   
2006 0.438 *** 0.539 *** 0.188    0.393 *** 0.045   
 0.090   0.022   0.179    0.092   0.051   
2007 0.257 *** 0.537 *** 0.521 ***  0.177 ** 0.081   
 0.056   0.020   0.105    0.085   0.061   
2008 0.296 *** 0.512 *** 0.423 ***  0.221 *** 0.075   
 0.047   0.016   0.092    0.081   0.059   
Average contribution to structural inequality   64.6% 35.4%  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eqs. (8) and (9).  All summary statistics based on the 
full sample available in the relevant year.  Note that equilibrium income is not defined in 
2009.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based on 1000 replications.  Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
